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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the risk of offshore oil and gas processing equipment operating in a harsh 
environment. It comprises of two major studies which form the core of journal papers submitted 
for publication. The first study presented a new risk assessment methodology with applications 
to fire scenarios in compressor and heat exchanger units. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to 
identify the critical components, their interdependence, and importance in causing failure. In the 
second study, a risk assessment approach is proposed that demonstrates how process system 
failure risk could be assessed in the absence of complete data.  The approach also highlighted the 
importance of interdependence of the failure causation factors. The Bayesian Network (BN) is 
used in the study to capture interdependence of and uncertainty the variables. Noisy-OR and 
Leaky Noisy-OR logics are used to improve uncertainty-handling capacity and overcome the 
data requirement. Application of the proposed approach is demonstrated on a subsea pipeline 
failure scenario. As a first step, a Bowtie (BT) was developed which captures all the possible 
failure causes of a leak and shows the potential consequences of a leak in the subsea pipeline. 
The BT was then mapped to a BN for OR, Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics.  Failure 
probabilities of Subsea Pipeline and its Safety Barriers were calculated with Bow-tie and 
Bayesian Network for different Logics. Finally, importance analysis was performed for 21 basic 
events using OR, Noisy- OR and Leaky Noisy OR Logics to determine safety critical elements.  
In Summary, this thesis provides scientifically sound and applied approaches to conduct risk 
assessment of process components with limited data. Applications of these approaches 
demonstrated on different case studies. Use of the proposed approaches would help better 
understanding of failure and hence improving safety of process system.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview of offshore facilities accidents 
As processing facilities handle enormous quantities of dangerous chemicals, risk analysis is 
an essential component in their operational procedures.  Process areas tend to be filled with high-
pressure compressors, separators and complex piping systems, may lead to accidents and 
equipment malfunctions, which in turn can cause catastrophic events (Khan et al., 2002; Torres-
Toledano and Sucar, 1998).  A number of offshore events have occurred since the early 1980s, 
such as the Piper Alpha event in the North Sea on July 6, 1988. The Piper Alpha accident was 
the result of a malfunctioning gas compression module that led to a massive gas condensate leak 
of ignition fuel, causing explosions and igniting a platform fire (Pate-Cornell, 1993). Though 
relatively minor initially, the pool fire then caused an explosion and fireball, collapsing the 
platform. Over 167 were killed; 62 survived, but suffered severe burns (Pate-Cornell, 1993). 
 A little over a decade later (March 21, 2001), a similar accident occurred in the Campos 
Basin off the coast of Brazil. There were two large explosions. The first one happened as the 
result of high pressure on the storage tank located at the aft starboard, where the pressure had 
risen to 10 bars. The resulting rupture caused the fluid inside the tank to leak out. The spilled gas 
caused the second explosion when it contacted an ignition source. The two blasts ended up 
sinking the entire platform, with one worker officially being declared dead and nine more 
missing and presumed dead (Baksh et al., 2016). 
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Another catastrophic event happened on July 27, 2005, in the Mumbai High Field, but 
unlike the deadly incidents mentioned above, the Mumbai event was due mainly to inclement 
weather. Hurricane-force winds compromised the equipment on one of the platforms, which then 
caused a gas leak and ignition. The fire that resulted quickly destroyed the first platform and 
jumped to neighbouring platforms. By August 1, the platforms had disappeared beneath the 
waves. In all, 22 workers were killed (Mitra, 2008; Walker, 2005).  
Another major incident was the BP refinery explosion in Texas City on March 23, 2005. It 
caused the death of 15 workers and seriously injured at least 170 more (CNN, 2005). BP’s 
official report (2005) placed the blame squarely on the lack of process safety measures at the 
refinery, along with inadequate risk reduction( Khan and Amyotte 2007). A few years later, on 
March 25, 2012, a gas and condensate leak on a North Sea platform sparked an evacuation, 
followed by a raging fire. No-one died or was injured in the incident, but it took five days to put 
the fire out (Henderson and Hainsworth, 2014). On July 23, 2013, a gas leak accident occurred in 
the Gulf of Mexico that destroyed a rig (Romero et al., 2016). On February 11, 2015, the Cidade 
de São Mateu on the Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO), based off the coast of 
Brazil, was destroyed by an explosion and subsequent fire. The FPSO’s pump room exploded 
from a leak of condensed material and the resulting shock between the engine room and pumps. 
Nine workers died in that event (Baksh et al., 2016; ANP, 2015). In yet another incident (April 1, 
2015), a fire was sparked on the Abkatun Alpha platform in the Gulf of Mexico by a gas-leak-
ignited explosion. Four workers died and 16 were injured (Baksh et al., 2016). 
The most notorious and well-known of recent oil rig disasters is the accident that occurred 
on the Deepwater Horizon platform on April 20, 2010. This event in the Gulf of Mexico not only 
led to the death of 11 workers and the sinking of the platform, but also caused the near demise of 
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the seafood industry in the Gulf. The leak poured out hundreds of millions of barrels of oil, while 
the toxins used to clean it up also contributed to the destruction of the Gulf’s ecosystem. At its 
worst, the oil slick from the uncapped well trailed for 80 miles along the coast of Florida and 140 
miles off the coasts of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.  Although 15 million gallons of oil 
and water mixture have since been recovered, the negative impact of the explosion, sinking and 
spill continue to be endured by all wildlife in the affected areas of the Gulf as well as in the states 
bordering the Gulf (Levy and Gopalakrishnan, 2010; Ciavarelli, 2016). 
Considering the above scenarios, enlarging the scope of risk analysis is crucial. This can be 
accomplished by analyzing accident scenarios and real-time safety plans in order to predict, 
gauge and revise the future potential for catastrophic events. The end goal is to take the 
appropriate actions to prevent events from occurring and to mitigate them should they occur. 
1.2 Safety analysis in offshore facilities  
As seen from the above descriptions, offshore platforms include the inherent risks of 
explosions, fires, spills, and sinking. Hydrocarbon leaks are the main cause of many of these 
incidents, which can lead to serious damage not only to the health and welfare of the rig workers, 
but also to the rigs themselves and to overall operations. At the same time, the environmental 
pollution that inevitably follows these types of events is also a major issue, along with 
compromises in power supply and economic impacts. The workers’ lack of safety measures and 
safety training is the main reason behind most of the accidents. 
Considering the wide effect these events have on people and ecosystems near and far, it is 
necessary to devise, adopt and apply safety measures that are rooted in solid and relevant 
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information and data. This information can then be analyzed in relation to a few or several 
factors that ignited the fire or explosion. 
In the years that have followed the catastrophe, the Deepwater Horizon event has provided 
researchers with a wealth of information. International companies and organizations have, in the 
wake of the well-publicized disaster, become significantly more aware of their safety options. 
Within a year of the accident, the European Commission developed a working paper that advised 
those involved in the oil and gas industry to come together as colleagues rather than remain 
isolated as competitors in order to “meet the challenges and threats to oil and gas production 
platforms through the exchange of information about past disasters to prevent their recurrence in 
the future” (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012). Since the paper’s release, several EU members 
have begun compiling databases (the UK-ORION Database and Norway-Petroleum Safety 
Authority) on accidents that occur on the continental shelf as well as developing information 
sources, exchanges and joint coordination sessions (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012). The 
intention is for safety analyses of the issues to result in solid measures to protect not just workers 
and the industry, but the environment as well (Khakzad et al., 2011). The widespread issues in 
the oil and gas industry over the past half-century make it essential for the industry to achieve a 
workable balance between profits and safety (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012; Khakzad et al., 
2011; Spouge, 1999).  
1.3 Risk Assessment Methods  
        The purpose of risk analysis focuses is to quantify the likelihood of the occurrence of 
certain accident scenarios. Several techniques are available, including fault tree (FT), event tree 
(ET), bow-tie (BT), safety barrier diagram, and Bayesian network (BN).  Over the years, 
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standard risk assessment approaches have helped to identify major risks and maintain safety in 
facilities. However, these techniques have limitations to their application of risk analysis when 
faced with complicated and interlinked systems. For instance, conventional FT is a typical 
approach used in quantitative risk analysis, but it is unable to analyze large systems, especially if 
the system has dependent primary events, common cause failures, or redundant failures. 
Furthermore, events that occur in a conventional FT are assumed to be independent, even though 
this is not always a valid assumption (Bobbio et al., 2001; Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998; 
Simon et al., 2007). 
          Similarly, most of the limitations recognized in conventional techniques like FT and ET 
are inherent in these approaches’ static nature, making them unable to keep up with the ever-
changing dynamic operation environment of process systems. This ever-changing environment 
can result from several factors, including alterations to the process environment or operational 
situation (e.g., changes in temperature, humidity, pressure, etc.) or to an analyst's estimation of 
the event.  
1.4 Objectives of the Research 
There are two major objectives of the study. These include the following: i) use a 
Bayesian based approach to identify the critical components responsible for a potential offshore 
accident. This is to help in decision making in terms of where to invest resources and how much 
resources should be utilised to address the risk of an offshore accident,  
ii) Map a FT and ET to a Bayesian Network and illustrate the use of a BN in the absence data.  
The latter is achieved through the use of Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics.   
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is written in manuscript format. Outline of each chapter is explained below: 
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction of the offshore facilities accidents, safety analysis in offshore 
facilities and risk assessment methods. The research objectives are mentioned in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 is the literature review part of this thesis. Risk assessment and conventional risk 
assessment methods are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 discusses process failure analysis considering causation dependency.  This chapter 
briefly presents two case studies which are compressor and heat exchanger tubes failure. A 
sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine the most critical equipment to fail. 
Chapter 4 presents the technique of mapping a Bow-tie to a BN. This study further shows how 
limitations of the bow-tie can be effectively addressed by adopting the mapping technique. The 
approach is good for capturing interdependency among events as well as uncertainty.  Also, this 
research highlights how limited data can be incorporated in a BN by using Noisy-OR and Leaky 
Noisy-OR logics.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Risk Assessment  
    Risk assessment consists of a number of different approaches for assessment potential 
accident scenarios within the process industries. The most common of these approaches is 
quantitative risk assessment (QRA), probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), and maximum credible 
accident analysis (Khan, 2001; Khan and Abbasi, 1998). Despite involving different procedures 
and stages, all of the risk assessment methods include: 1) likelihood and 2) accident scenario 
identification of mechanisms. Based on reliability and efficiency in analyzing and identifying 
accident scenarios, the most popular models are fault tree (FT), event tree (ET), and bow-tie 
(BT). 
   Conventional risk assessment methods have played a key role in maintaining safety in 
process facilities and in warning users about risks in the system. However, the tried-and-trued 
approaches mentioned above are static in that they mainly utilize generic failure data (Meel and 
Seider, 2006). Given this shortfall, a probabilistic method grounded in Bayes' rule i.e., a 
Bayesian network (BN) is gaining in popularity with safety experts.   
2.2 Conventional Risk Assessment Methods   
2.2.1 Fault Tree (FT)   
A Fault Tree (FT) is defined as a graphic methodology that applies deductive reasoning 
to gauge the failure probability rates of a system. In an FT, the top event refers to an unwanted 
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incident that can subsequently cause hazardous conditions. The intermediate and basic events are 
assigned in a downward direction from the top event. Any failure of a basic event can cause a 
failure in the intermediate event and initiate an unwanted event. 
FT is a combination of a series of events and logic gates (Khakzad et al., 2011). Two 
types of Boolean logic gates – OR and AND gates – are used, and analysis can be either 
quantitative or qualitative (Nivolianitou et al., 2004). In the AND gate, there is an interaction of 
process components in a parallel structure. Hence, process failure can only result from the 
simultaneous failure of all components in parallel. On the other hand, process components 
interact in a series structure in the OR gate. Hence, the failure of any basic event causes the 
failure of the process (Adedigba et al., 2016a).  As a visualization example, Figure 2.1 shows 
two typical OR (left) and AND (right) gates and their equations. 
Equation (2.1) describes the event failure probability in a parallel structure (i.e., AND gate), 
while Equation (2.2) describes the top event failure probability in a series structure (i.e., OR 
gate): 
 
𝑃 = ∏ 𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.1) 
 
𝑃 =  ∏(1 − 𝑃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.2) 
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Figure 2-1: Illustration of the OR (left) and AND gate (right) in fault trees 
 
  Figure 2.2 illustrates a standard FT comprised of various components such as the top event 
(TE), intermediate events (IE), and basic events (BE). 
Top Event
Intermediate 
Event 1
Intermediate 
Event2
AND
OR OR
Basic 
Event1
Basic 
Event2
Basic 
Event3
Basic 
event 4
 
  
Figure 2-2: Generic Fault Tree model 
2.2.2 Event Tree (ET)   
Event Tree (ET) is a graphical representation of the logical model that determines the 
potential outcomes after the initiation of an undesired event (Marhavilas et al., 2011). ETA can 
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be applied to both qualitative and quantified risk analysis and shows the consequences of the 
sequential failure of safety barriers. Although ETA can be considered an intuitive approach, it 
does not represent either the state of the system or its environment, both of which can have an 
impact on the evolution of events (Bearfield and Marsh, 2005). Figure 2 illustrates an ETA 
comprised of various components such as accident consequences (C) and safety barriers (SB).  
 
T
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SB1 SB2
C1
C2
C3
C4
 
Figure 2-3: Generic Event Tree model 
 
It is useful to know which possible combinations of primary events in a fault tree could result in 
a top event and which safety function failures can escalate the top event to a specific event tree 
consequence. For instance, in Figure 2.3, the occurrence probability of consequence C4 can be 
calculated as: 
 
 
Where P (TE) indicates the top event probability and P (SB1) and P (SB2) indicate, respectively, 
the failure probabilities of SB1 and SB2. 
 
 𝑃 (𝐶4) =  𝑃 (𝑇𝐸)×𝑃 (𝑆𝐵1)×( 1 − 𝑃 (𝑆𝐵2)) (2.3) 
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2.2.3 Bow-Tie (BT) 
Bow-Tie (BT) is a tool in quantitative risk analysis that provides a pictorial 
representation of the process of risk assessment. It is a combination of FT and ET and is 
becoming increasingly popular in the oil and gas industry (Saud et al., 2014). An FT of an 
undesired event is shown on the left side of the BT diagram, and an ET of the possible 
consequences due to initiation of the top event of the FT is shown on the right side. BT helps in 
the evaluation of the possible failure causes and several possible consequences of a hazard. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates a standard BT comprised of various components, including basic events 
(BE), intermediate events (IE), and top event (TE). The figure also shows safety barriers (SB) 
and accident consequences (C).   
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Figure 2-4: Generic Bow-Tie model 
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It is useful to know which possible combinations of primary events in a fault tree could result in 
a top event and which safety function failures can escalate the top event to a specific event tree 
consequence. For instance, in Figure 2.4, the occurrence probability of consequence C4 can be 
calculated as shown in equation (2.3). 
2.3 Bayesian Methods 
 2.3.1 Bayesian Networks 
The use of Bayesian networks (BNs) is increasing in the construction of risk 
management, system reliability models, and safety analysis profiles that depend on probabilistic 
and weak data. Like fault tree and reliability block diagramming, BN is a graphical probabilistic 
method that includes both quantitative and qualitative elements. More specifically, BNs are 
considered directed acyclic graphs where nodes indicate variables, arcs indicate direct causal 
relationships among linked nodes, and conditional probability tables connected to the nodes 
indicate how robustly the interconnected nodes impact each other (Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 
1998). 
 The node from which an arc is created is called a parent node, while the node at which 
the arc is directed is called a child node. Conditional probability tables (CPTs) denote the degree 
of dependency among different events (Khakzad et al., 2013b). A BN is another tool that can be 
used in safety and risk analysis. Its main advantages include the ability to represent event 
dependencies, capture uncertainty, and update probabilities (Khakzad et al., 2011). It also allows 
for the incorporation of process knowledge of experts in case of data unavailability. 
According to the chain rule and conditional independence, the joint probability distribution, 
P(U) of a set of random events, U = {A1, … . . , An} is incorporated into the network as  
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𝑃(𝑈) =  ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
│𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖) ) (2.4) 
Where Pa(Ai) is the parent set of Ai (Pearl,1998; Jense and Nielsen,2007).   
A BN utilizes the Bayes’ theorem to update the prior occurrence probability of events based on 
information. This information is known as evidence (𝐸 ). Posterior (𝑃/𝐸) refers to the belief of 
an event based on evidence. The posterior probability can be calculated by using the Equation 
(2.5).  
 
P (U E) =
P(U, E)
P(E)
=
P(U, E)
∑ P(U, E)U  
⁄  (2.5) 
2.3.2 Bayes' Theorem 
Bayes’ theory is often aligned with methods such as BT (Badreddine and Ben Amor, 
2010; Khakzad et al., 2011) and ET (Meet and Seider, 2006; Kalantarnia et al., 2009; 
Rathnayaka et al., 2011) as well as dynamic risk assessment and safety analysis. These types of 
hybrid approaches utilize the Bayes’ theory to revise initial beliefs or prior probabilities of events 
by using information taken from a specific event. Thus: 
 P (X/ data) =  
𝑃 (𝑥)𝑃 (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎/𝑥)
𝑃( 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)
                                                                                  (2.6) 
where P(x) indicates the prior failure probability of event x, P(datalx) refers to the likelihood 
function of x, P(data) refers to the probability of data observed (i.e., evidence), and P(xldata) 
indicates the posterior probability of x. Ferson (2005) noted that calculating P(data) as an 
estimation can be highly complex. However, if both the prior and likelihood function were 
conjugate (Ferson, 2005; Meel and Seider, 2006), then the prior and posterior distribution would 
be the same and the calculation would be relatively straight-forward. So, for instance, if the prior 
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probability involves a Beta distribution (or Gamma) while the likelihood function shows a 
Bernoulli (or Poisson) one, the posterior’s distribution is Beta (Gamma). In instances involving 
non-conjugate distributions, however, the posterior distribution can be derived via numerical 
methods, which somewhat restricts the application of the approach. 
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Abstract  
 
Offshore oil and gas processing equipment operating in harsh environment poses high risk. This 
risk is further increased by the susceptibility of the equipment to natural disasters such as 
hurricanes and snowstorms due to harsh environment. When equipment functionality is 
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compromised, it can become a hazard to personnel as well as to other equipment. The key safety 
practice on the offshore facility to isolate the equipment and minimize consequences associated 
with the processing equipment failures. When and how to isolate vulnerable equipment is a 
challenge due to limited understanding of the equipment’s susceptibility and dependency to 
failure causes and consequences. This paper presents a methodology to analyze potential failure 
scenarios considering causation dependency and also to determine which parameter(s) have the 
most impact on the failure. The results of the analysis are used to identify most sensitive 
equipment and the failure causes. This analysis will help to develop effective risk management 
strategies focusing on critical equipment.  The methodology comprises of multiple phases which 
include data collection, probabilistic analysis and sensitivity analysis.  
Keywords: Sensitivity analysis; Offshore safety analysis; Bayesian network; Causal 
dependency; Probabilistic modelling. 
3.1. Introduction 
Accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry are mainly caused by human factors, climatic 
conditions, mechanical facilities and technical lapses (Gordon, 1998). Numerous offshore 
accidents have taken place over the past few decades, such as the Piper Alpha incident that 
occurred in the North Sea on July 6, 1988. This accident was caused by a compromised gas 
compression module, which resulted in a massive leakage of gas condensate. The leak on 
ignitions caused explosions and a pool fire on the platform (Pate-Cornell, 1993). The pool fire 
led to the subsequent explosion and fireball that resulted in the collapse of the platform. In this 
accident, over 167 people were killed and 62 survived, with severe injuries, mostly burns (Pate-
Cornell, 1993). A similar accident took place on March 21, 2001, in the Campos Basin, off the 
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coast of Brazil. On the P-36 platform, two large explosions occurred. The first one occurred 
mainly as a result of excessive application of pressure to the aft starboard drains storage tank, 
where pressure had risen to 10 bars. When the tank could no longer hold the pressure, a rupture 
occurred and the fluid inside the tank began to leak. The leakage was followed by a second and 
more intense blast that was caused by contact between the spilled gas and an ignition source. The 
two blasts ultimately caused the destruction and sinking of the giant platform. As a result of the 
accident, one worker died immediately and nine others were missing and presumed dead (Baksh 
et al., 2001). More recently, an incident occurred on July 27, 2005, in the Mumbai High Field.  
Unlike the two accidents described earlier, this one was caused by inclement weather. During the 
storm, equipment on board one of the platforms was damaged due to hurricane-force winds, 
leading to a gas leak and ignition. The subsequent fire devoured that platform and moved onto 
others. Moreover, the risers’ failure led to the leakage of massive amounts of gas, such that on 
August 1, 2005, the first platform sank, followed a few hours later by another one. In total, the 
week-long event killed at least 22 workers (Mitra, 2008; Walker, 2005). On March 25, 2012, a 
gas and condensate leakage on a platform in the North Sea led to the evacuation of workers due 
to a fear of fire and explosion.  Despite precautionary measures taken, the fire burned for five 
days before being extinguished (Henderson and Hainsworth., 2014). On July 23, 2013, an 
incident took place in the Gulf of Mexico that resulted in the burning of a rig, likely caused by a 
gas leak (natural gas condensate) (Romero et al., 2016). Then, on February 11, 2015, yet another 
accident took place in Brazil, this time on the Cidade de São Mateu on the Floating Production 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO). In this event, the FPSO’s pump room exploded due to a leakage 
of condensed material and the shock between the engine room and pumps. Nine workers were 
reported dead (Baksh et al., 2016; ANP, 2015). On April 1, 2015, a gas leak-caused explosion 
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ignited a fire on the Abkatun Alpha platform in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in 4 deaths and 16 
injuries (Baksh et al., 2016). 
  Perhaps the most well known recent disaster in recent history is that which occurred on 
April 20, 2010, on the Deep-water Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The disaster caused 
not only the deaths of 11 workers and the near destruction of the platform, but it also led to the 
decimation of the seafood industry in and around the Gulf due to the unprecedented levels of 
toxins caused by both the leak itself and the chemicals used to clean it up. The Deep-water 
Horizon’s oil slick spanned 80 miles off the coast of Florida and 140 miles off Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Alabama states.  Fifteen million gallons of oil and water mixture were recovered, 
but the impact of the spill is still being felt in the affected states (Levy and Gopalakrishnan., 
2010; Ciavarelli, 2016). 
It is evident from past accidents in the offshore process facility that equipment failure risk 
is strongly dependent on the harsh environment operating condition. In offshore facility, 
equipment failure quickly becomes a hazard to personnel as well as to other equipment. There is 
limited understanding on when and how to isolate vulnerable equipment to minimize equipment 
failure risk. There is no work reported in public domain that help better understanding of the of 
the equipment’s susceptibility and dependency to failure causes and consequences. This paper 
aims to fill this gap between analyzing potential failure scenarios and determine which 
parameters have the most impact on the failure. Sensitivity analysis is also performed to study 
the vulnerability of the causes and interaction of different failure scenarios. This work will help 
to develop effective operational risk management strategies focusing on key equipment to 
minimize overall facility risk.    
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This paper is organised is six sections. Section 1 provides background information on the 
importance of safety in offshore operation, particularly the one in harsh environment. Section 2 
briefly captures offshore process operation, whereas section 3 details the research methodology. 
Application of the proposed methodology is discussed in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 presents the 
conclusions.  
3.1.1 Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment in Offshore Facilities 
        Following the descriptions in the previous section, it is apparent that offshore platforms 
bring with them extensive risks in the form of fires, explosions, and spills. Many of these 
accidents are caused by hydrocarbon leaks and have major impacts on operations as well as on 
the workers.  The environmental pollution caused by these incidents is an equally compelling 
issue, as is the loss of power supplies and subsequent economic impacts. Most of these problems 
are the direct result of the absence of safety measures and safety training among platform and rig 
workers. Given the broad impact of these events which occur on offshore platforms but affect 
people thousands of kilometres away, it is essential to adopt safety measures based on the 
relevant information and data. This information should then be analyzed with reference to the 
factors that led to the critical equipment failure, which then caused the accidents.  
         In terms of lessons learnt, the Deep-water Horizon spill is a watershed of information. 
Since the occurrence of the disaster in 2010, international companies and organizations have 
become considerably more safety-conscious.  For instance, the European Commission (Christou, 
and Konstantinidou, 2012) has tabled a working paper calling for a concerted effort of all 
involved in the oil and gas industry to “meet the challenges and threats to oil and gas production 
platforms through the exchange of information about past disasters to prevent their recurrence in 
the future”. The working paper has prompted several members of the EU to develop a database 
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on accidents that take place on the continental shelf (e.g., the UK – ORION Database and 
Norway – Petroleum Safety Authority). There are also additional information sources, exchanges 
and joint coordination, such as the OGP – Well Control Incident Database, the main purpose of 
which is to analyze accidents (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012). Safety analysis would lead to 
measures that will protect the environment (Khakzad et al., 2011). Given the death and 
destruction caused by accidents over the past 50 years, it is imperative that the marine industry 
strive for a workable balance between safety and the profits flowing from oil and gas production 
(Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012; Khakzad et al., 2011; Spouge, 1999). 
3.1.2 Techniques for Safety Analysis of Offshore Processing  
        Several analysis techniques are used to analyze safety and estimate risks. These include 
quantitative analysis and qualitative approaches.  Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is, for the 
most part, a prerequisite in offshore installations in Norway, the United Kingdom, and most oil 
producing countries. The aim of QRA is to give the designer sufficient information to enable 
him/her to build a complete picture of the maritime system properties. At the same time, the 
quantified occurrence probability of each major failure condition and possible consequences 
should also be addressed. In contrast, qualitative safety evaluations set forth a series of steps that 
define or identify any potential risks. In this approach, information is relayed via chart, tables, 
fault trees, event trees and other tools.  The goal here is to devise some measures to address 
potential safety, as highlighted by information obtained from the qualitative assessment 
(Rouvroye, and Van den Bliek, 2002).  Table 1 is a list of some of the most used risk assessment 
tools. The qualitative ones include Analysis by experts (Domain expert knowledge) and Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis whiles the quantitative ones are Fault Tree Analysis, Hybrid methods, 
Enhanced Markov Analysis and Bayesian Network. 
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Table 3-1: Quantitative and qualitative risk analysis tools 
Scenario Analysis Method Details 
Analysis by experts  
(Domain expert knowledge) 
Uses information from previous experiences centred on 
the same or similar applications. This approach is 
classified as a qualitative analysis (Rouvroye, and Van 
den Bliek, 2002). 
Hazard and Operability Study 
(HAZOP) 
 
Design review technique used for hazard, and design 
deficiencies’ identification affecting the system 
operability. Uses guide words (i.e more, less, early, late) 
to describe the deviations. Performed by a multi-
discipline team including a safety specialist to lead the 
study (Kletz, 1999). 
Hazard Identification  
(HAZID) 
Early hazards detection technique in the conceptual or 
detailed design stage. Similar to HAZOP, HAZID uses 
guide words (i.e more, less, early, late) to describe the 
deviations. It identifies the required safeguards and the 
areas where further understanding of safeguard 
effectiveness is needed (Halliburton, 2015). 
Fault Tree Analysis  
(FTA) 
Analyzes from the top down. This approach reveals the 
impacts of basic events on the top event 
(Talebberrouane and Lounis, 2016) 
Hybrid methods This approach can be a combination between, fault tree 
analysis and Markov process (Talebberrouane et al., 
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2016) or reliability block diagrams. 
Enhanced Markov Analysis (EMA) This approach groups together uncertainty analysis, 
sensitivity analysis and Markov analysis. 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Graphical representation indicating the relationship 
between the components that comprise a system, 
including how the reliability and functionality of each 
component affects the success or failure of the entire 
system. 
Bayesian Network (BN) A directed acyclic graphs based on the conditional 
probability given by the Bayes rule. Popular technique 
for determining safety analysis, a comparison with the 
fault tree is given in (Khakzad et al., 2011).   
 
Bayesian networks are widely used, as a probabilistic tool, in multiples domains with 
significant number of applications (Wilson et al., 2007). Comparing to other quantitative risk 
analysis methods, the BN provides multi-levels and multi-states dependencies to be taken in 
consideration. Additionally, BN structure is easily tractable to check the way that the 
dependencies are described, also if all the features are taken into consideration. In case of any 
feature is missing, it can be easily implemented in the network. Similarly, the implementation of 
new information such as the evidence on one or multiple parameters can be done on 
mathematical basis, which is the Bayes rule.  
In BN modelling, dependency is presented in two ways; vertical dependency (i.e the intermediate 
nodes depend on the basic or the root cause nodes), and horizontal dependency where the basic 
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nodes are depending on each other. This horizontal dependency is what differentiates the BN 
from the logical diagram methods such as fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET) where the structure 
is based on the basic event independency. These dependencies vertical and horizontal are all 
dictated in form of CPT based on the domain expert knowledge. For more details about the CPT, 
the reader is referred to the work of Wilson et al (2007).   
3.1.3 Equipment Safety during Offshore Processing 
In oil and gas production, the processing of liquids is first done at the drilling sites, which 
in this case are offshore platforms. The product is then transferred onshore. The offshore 
production facility comprises six main units, namely the platform, the rig, the processing plant, 
the means of transport, employee accommodations, and utilities. Several different processes take 
place on the platforms, such as the removal (i.e., separation) of oil/gas from the water and the 
compression of gas. These activities can be hazardous, as even a small leak or error could cause 
a fatal or costly accident. Some issues that could potentially affect offshore platforms are 
structural failure, helicopter incidents, and collisions with marine craft. However, even more 
dangerous is the potential for events involving fire and explosions. Given the damage that such 
incidents can cause on platforms, this study will highlight two main areas of the processing plant 
– gas compression and dehydration (Khan et al., 2002).  
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                               Figure 3-1: Schematic of the offshore oil and gas processing equipment. 
  3.2. Description of the Process 
Table 3-2 gives a detailed description of the main units and their components as well as 
the potential problems in the system. The focus is on gas processing. Therefore oil and water 
treatment systems are not given much attention. 
Table 3-2: Table showing description and problems of the offshore oil and gas processing 
equipment. 
Unit Description 
Separation 
This unit enables a separation of the volatile fluids in order to achieve the best 
possible recuperation of fluid while isolating the water for removal and settling 
the oil and gas (Havard, 2013). 
 
Water This unit is used for treating contaminated water which contains sand. This is 
Oil and Gas 
from well 
Separation Unit 
Gas Dehydration 
Unit 
Gas 
Compression 
Unit 
Oil Treatment Storage 
tanks 
Users 
Water Treatment Water 
injection 
Gas 
Water 
Oil 
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treatment 
 
done by using a sand cyclone to isolate the debris. After this, a hydro cyclone is 
used to separate the oil from water (Havard, 2013). 
Gas   
compression 
unit 
 
This unit is used for re-pressurizing the gas after it emerges from the three-phase 
separators (Havard, 2013; Mokhatab et al., 2006). The gas compression unit is 
made up of centrifugal compressor, heat exchanger, gas turbine, and electric 
generator. Centrifugal compressor allows the passage of gas through the 
compressor’s inlet nozzle and onto the impeller inlet (Mokhatab et al., 2006). 
Due to the constant stream of gases being released in this unit it is very 
vulnerable to fire (Mokhatab et al., 2006). Heat exchanger lowers the 
temperature, through a cool-down process (Havard, 2013).  A corroded unit may 
lead to heat exchange tubes failure (Usman,  and Khan, 2008). Gas turbine is the 
source of electrical energy for powering the compressor. It is prone to major 
failures which include the entire system breakdown due to malfunction of the 
blade, (Farrahi, et al., 2011). Corrosion, creep, and fatigue (Carter, 2005) are 
other notable problems. Electric generator converts electrical energy from 
mechanical energy and is prone to bearing failures, cooling system damage, rotor 
insulation failure (Alewine, and Chen, 2012). 
Storage Tank 
Storage is used for storing the oil and is susceptible to explosions, fires, lightning 
strikes, open flames, cracks and leaks. These are caused by operational defects, 
human error, and terrorism (Chang and Lin., 2006).  
Gas 
dehydration 
This unit consist of Absorption column, Re-boiler, Still (Stripper), Glycol 
circulation pump, and Heat exchanger. The whole unit functions as a gas drying 
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unit unit. The absorption column may suffer from foaming. Re-boilers are subject to 
glycol degradation, salt contamination, and heat-related stress. Still (Stripper) 
faces condensation and flooding issues. Over-circulation, under-circulation, and 
pump wear affect the Glycol circulation pump significantly while the heat 
exchanger have problems with regards to heat retention in the lean glycol, salt 
deposits and corrosion (Mokhatab et al., 2006; Anyadiegwu et al.,   2014; 
Zangana, 2012). 
Pipeline The pipeline moves the gas from the offshore platforms to the processing facility. 
The main problems include erosion, corrosion, mechanical and material 
problems, and equipment failure ((Havard,2013; Brito, and de Almeida, 2009; 
Timashev and Bushinskaya, 2016). 
  
3.3. Research Methodology 
A crucial part of industrial processes is the safety system, which functions to prevent 
certain conditions from further developing into a hazard. Therefore, when safety systems fail, 
there can be direct consequences ranging from equipment damage, work stoppages, unexpected 
expenses, environmental degradation, crew injury and death. Safety systems should be 
operational at all times, regardless of cost or inconvenience to the operator. To achieve non-stop 
optimal operation of these systems, a multi objective design is needed. The methodology 
comprises of multiple phases and shown in figure 3-2. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 describe the steps 
adopted for this methodology 
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Figure 3-2: Flow chart for the proposed Methodology 
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3.1 Step 1: Data collection  
 
Prior hazard identification, such as HAZOP study, should be performed to identify the 
section presenting relevant potential hazard. In this study, the compression section was taken as a 
subject of study due to the relevant risk associated with this section in all process industry, and 
especially the offshore facilities due to the specification of the offshore infrastructure. Eight 
important elements of the offshore processing equipment have been studied as well as the 
problems and failures that expose them. However, two elements have been presented for the 
purposes of illustrating the methodology in this paper. These include the compressor unit and the 
heat exchanger. The failure probability data of basic events were mostly collected from the 
Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (OREDA, 2002) and other resources.   
3.2 Step 2: Probabilistic analysis 
Bayesian Networks, (BNs) are probabilistic models which are derived from directed 
graphs.  In these models, nodes represent random variables of the scenario or system under 
investigation. While links between the nodes show the dependence levels of the random 
variables. The graph structure of the BNs enables complex problems to be decomposed, as 
modelling can interpret causal relationships in the variables. Such an approach both facilitates 
the modelling process and has computational advantages. BNs can be applied at any stage of 
probabilistic analysis and may replace fault and event trees due to several advantages that have 
been presented in sub-section 1.2. Furthermore, because of their mind-mapping abilities, BNs 
can be utilized in the early stages of probabilistic analysis, where the primary aim is to find 
possible scenarios as well as the linkage of events that might lead to possible adverse 
consequences. Hence, BNs provide a versatile approach to assessing anticipated equipment 
failure, as they build model scenarios by asserting conditional probabilities of failure events. The 
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probabilities of the most credible scenarios are analyzed using GeNie software (Faber  et al., 
2012). Probabilistic failure analysis was performed based on dependencies identification 
between the root causes, linking the scenarios’ elements. It aims to provide accurate analysis 
where the elements are interconnected in a conditional way. Bayesian networks were chosen as 
modelling support for this study because of their ability to handle the uncertainty and the ability 
to represent the conditional interdependency between multiples nodes.    
3.3 Step 3: Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis (SA) is the study of how the uncertainty in the output of a model, 
in this case the top event or the unwanted hazard, can be apportioned to different sources of 
uncertainty in the model input (Saltelli, 2002). In this study, the sensitivity analysis is performed 
in the case of dependency between the root causes and the case of independency. The approach 
adopted for conducting the sensitivity analysis is that, the percentages of each root cause 
representing a parameter have been increased from 0% to 100% by a step of 10%. Then based on 
the BN model, the percentage change on the probability of the top event is reported. All the 
generated data from the BN model are presented in charts below. To find out which of the basic 
events has more impact on the undesired event, a comparative study is performed based on the 
generated data.  Equation (1) below is used for sensitivity analysis calculations:                                           
 
 Percentage change =
posterior probability−Prior probability
Prior  probability
×100                          (3.1)   
   3.4.  Application of methodology to offshore processing system units 
This section describes the various scenarios for each system unit investigated. The units 
include i) Compressor unit ii) Heat Exchanger iii) Turbine iv) Combustion v ) Generator vi) 
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Storage tanks vii) Pipeline viii) Dehydration unit  but only  compressor and heat exchanger 
analysis are presented here. The compressor fire scenario has been divided into basic and 
intermediate events. The basic events contain major failure events such as break in seal, faulty 
installation of seal, lubrication decrease, crack in valve plates, weak springs, rotor cracks, rotor 
jammed, weak installation, casing friction with the rotor, pipeline joints, pipeline, break in blade, 
worn compressors, gear of the shaft breaks, rotor frictional with casing  and the intermediate 
events comprise of release from seal, release from compressor valve, release from rotor, 
compressor or casing release, release from the compressor, release from downstream, release 
from upstream, frictional sparks, high operation temperature, ignition source and gas release. 
Formulation of the Bayesian networks is based on the conditional probabilities table (CPT), 
where the probability of intermediate event is based on the conditional states of the basic events. 
In example, the probabilities of over-speeding, lubrication failure, contamination, vibration 
during start-up and misalignment are the root causes influencing the bearing failure’s occurrence. 
However, the presence of one or two of them cannot make ensure that the bearing will fail. On 
the other hand, the root causes are not contributing in the same level for the bearing failure. All 
this knowledge can be incorporate through deterministic probabilities in the CPT. For more 
details about the CPT, the reader is referred to the work of Nielsen and Jensen (2009) and the 
work of Jensen (1996).  
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  For the heat exchanger tubes scenario, the basic events contain major failure events such 
as fretting due to vibration, microbes problems, presence of CO2, H2S,cavitation, high fluid 
velocity, presence of sand, weak material, high temperature, high pressure, foreign particles in 
fluid, improper filters, surface deposits, inappropriate filters cleaning, weak tube material, fluid 
hammer, external forces and the intermediate events comprise of corrosion, metal erosion, tubes 
cracking, buckling of tubes, tubes structure failure, fouling, tubes clogging and tube leakage. 
Table 3-3: Elements of BN model for the compressor unit and their probabilities. 
Basic Events Failure frequency per year 
Break in seal 1.2×10−3 
Lubrication decrease 1.8×10−3 
Faulty installation* 3.0×10−4 
Crack in valve plates* 3.0×10−3 
Weak springs* 2.5×10−3 
Draining valve left open 2.0×10−3 
Rotor cracks 2.1×10−2 
Rotor jammed* 1.0×10−2 
Weak installation 6.0×10−3 
Casing friction with Rotor * 1.0×10−3 
Downstream pipeline joints** 9.0×10−3 
Downstream pipeline** 6.5×10−4 
Upstream pipeline** 3.0×10−3 
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Upstream pipeline joints** 4.5×10−3 
Break in blade 7.0×10−4 
Worn compressors 4.0×10−3 
Gear of the shaft breaks 2.5×10−2 
Rotor friction with casing 1.0×10−3 
Over-speeding* 5.0×10−4 
Lubrication failure* 1.0×10−4 
Contamination* 3.0×10−4 
Vibration during start-up* 2.5×10−3 
Misalignment* 2.0×10−4 
 
All the probabilities provided in Table 3-3 are taken from OREDA database (OREDA 2002), 
except the elements that carry one-star mark (*) are taken from domain expert knowledge, and 
the elements that carry two star marks (**) are taken from the reference (Khan et al., 2002). 
Table 3-4: Elements of BN model for the Heat Exchanger tubes Failure and their probabilities. 
Basic Events Failure frequency per year 
Vibration 0.4×10−3 
Baffle failure 0.1×10−3 
Material fatigue 0.2×10−3 
Microbes problems* 1.1×10 −3 
Presence of Co2, H2S* 1.0×10−3 
Cavitation 2.1×10−4 
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High fluid velocity 3.0×10−3 
Presence of sand* 2.3×10−4 
Weak material 1.0×10−3 
High temperature 8.8×10−4 
High pressure 4×10−4 
Foreign particles in fluid* 4.2×10−4 
Improper filters* 5×10−4 
Draining not performed 0.2×10−3 
Surface deposits 3.1×10−4 
Inappropriate filters cleaning 1×10−3 
Improper dimensions* 0.83×10−3 
Inadequate materials* 0.2×10−3 
Fluid hammer* 1.04×10−3 
External forces 8.3×10−3 
 
All the probabilities provided in Table 3-4 are taken from OREDA database (OREDA 2002), 
except the elements that carry one-star mark (*) are taken from domain expert knowledge. The 
data provided in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 is presented as examples and it doesn’t represent the 
definitive complete set.  
3.5. Results and Discussion  
As can be seen in the Bayesian Network of the compressor unit shown in Figure3-2, fire is 
assumed to be the top event scenario to occur in the unit, this model was constructed using 
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GeNie software.  By employing the basic events data shown in Table 3-3, both the top event 
scenario failure probability and the intermediate event conditional probability table (packaged by 
Subject Matter Experts) were determined. For the top event scenario, the failure probability was 
calculated as 8.39×10 −4 occurrence/year in the case of basic events (BE) or root causes 
independency. In Figure3-3, the root causes dependencies are represented in hatched arrows to 
differentiate them from the other dependencies.   In the case of BE dependencies’ consideration, 
the probability of fire is 7×10 −3 occurrence/year. As it is noticeable, considering the root 
causes dependencies has a big impact on the probability of hazard.  
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        Figure 3-3:  BN model for the compressor unit (BE dependencies in hatched arrows). 
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    Figure 3-3(a): Sensitivity analysis of the compressor in case of independency. 
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 Figure 3-3 (b): Sensitivity analysis of the compressor in case of independency. 
With independency, all basic events are considered in order to pinpoint the elements 
which are more sensitive than the others. Figure 3-3 (a, b) highlights elements which are 
sensitive in cases of independency. As we can see by the increasing slope on the graph for each 
element, 11 elements in total are sensitive, of which gear of the shaft breaks and rotor cracks 
emerge as the most sensitive.  
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When the element percentage rose from 10 to 100%, the probability of fire also rose. For gear of 
the shaft breaks, when the increase was 100%, the probability of fire rose to 39%. For rotor 
cracks, when the probability of failure rose 100%, the probability of fire rose to 18%. 
Six out of the eleven elements are the same, such that every pair of elements share the same fire 
probability when the element percentage increases from 10% to 100%.  Hence, they are 
illustrated separately in figure 3-3 (b).  
In situations involving downstream pipelines and crack in valve plates, when the probability of 
crack in valve plates rise beyond 30%, the probability of fire increases by 2%. 
Similarly, in instances involving rotor friction with casing and upstream pipeline joints, if the 
failure probabilities rise beyond 50%, the fire percentage probabilities also increases by 2%. For 
rotor friction with casing, when the probability rose beyond 20% until 80%, the probability of 
fire increases by 2% and 4% when the probability of rotor friction with casing is doubled.  As 
can be seen, both of the elements are nearly the same. 
In instances involving break in blade and worn compressors, if the failure probability increases 
beyond 30%, the fire probabilities percentages increases by 2%, showing them to be exactly the 
same.  
The graph was created using the equations (3.1).  The percentage of each element increased from 
10% to 100% by a step of 10%, while equation (3.1) was used to determine whether there was a 
change in terms (i.e., rise or fall) in the percentage of fire probability.   
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Figure 3-4(a): Sensitivity analysis of compressor in case of dependency. 
 
 
Figure 3-4(b): Sensitivity analysis of compressor in case of dependency. 
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For dependency cases, lubrication decrease and break in blade were not considered, as 
both of these occurrences are classified as intermediate events. Figure 3-4 (a) and (b) show 
elements those are sensitive to dependency. As can be seen, 11 elements show as being sensitive, 
but the most sensitive elements are gear of the shaft breaks and rotor cracks. This is determined 
by the rise in the steepness of each element’s shape.  
When each element’s percentage rose between 10 and 100%, the probability of fire likewise 
rose. With gear of the shaft breaks, when the increase reached 100%, the fire probability rose by 
28%. With impeller cracks, the fire probability stood at 15% when the probability of failure 
rose100%.  
Six out of the total eleven elements are exactly the same, such that every pair of elements share 
the same fire probability when the element percentages increase from 10% to 100%.  Therefore, 
they are illustrated separately in figure 3-4(b).  
Moreover, situations involving weak springs and break in seal show that they both match and 
also share the same fire probability if the failure probability increases from 10% to 100%. 
However, there is a slight difference at the 80% marker, where the fire probability is 0% for 
weak springs but 1.40% for break in seal. 
Furthermore, if the element percentage increases in a range from 10% to 100%, the fire 
probability is the same for downstream pipeline and crack in valve plates, with a few exceptions: 
At 40%, the fire probability for downstream pipeline is 0%, whereas for crack in valve plates it is 
1.40%.  When the probability of downstream pipeline and crack in valve plates rise beyond 10%, 
the probability of fire increased by 1.40%.  Note that the same steps used to formulate Figure3-3 
were also used to formulate Figure 3-4 (a, b). 
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Figure 3-5: Comparison of percentage change for the dependency and independency relationship 
of the elements. 
 
Figure 3-5 was derived from Figure 3-3 and 3-4(a, b). In Fig. 3-5, we can see the 
percentage changes for similar elements where there is either dependency or independency. So, 
for instance, we can see that gear of the shaft breaks show a higher percentage in case of 
independency (21.2%), while rotor cracks show a higher percentage in case of independency 
(10%).  Figure 3-5 was obtained by first taking the average for each element according to 
dependency and independency, and then comparing them to see which elements have greater 
percentage changes.  
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Figure 3-6: Reduction in percentage between dependency causation and independency   
causation. 
 
 Figure 3-6 was derived from Figure 3-5. It depicts comparisons of the dependency and 
independency calculated for each element in order to show a reduction percentage. Gear of the 
shaft breaks and impeller cracks show a reduction percentage of 5.86% and 1.36%, respectively. 
While, upstream pipeline joints and worn compressors display a reduction of 0.16% and 0.24%. 
3.5.1. Heat exchanger tubes failure 
 
Figure 3-7 is similar to Figure 3-3, except for the inclusion of 20 basic events and 11 
intermediate events. Also, the failure of the heat exchanger tubes is the top event scenario, and 
data from Table 3-4 is used.  Figure 3-7 illustrates basic events dependency, with the failure 
probability of the top event scenario being 1.09×10−3.  Also, in Figure 3-7, the dependencies 
among cavitation with high fluid velocity, high temperature with high pressure and surface 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 %
43 
 
deposits with inappropriate filters cleaning are shown.  From this, the failure probability of the 
top event scenario can be calculated as1.14×10−3.  
   
 
Figure 3-7: BN model for the Heat exchanger tubes failure (BE dependencies in hatched arrows). 
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Figure 3-8: Sensitivity analysis of heat exchanger tubes failure in case of independency. 
 
In case of independency, all basic events were considered in order to determine which of 
the elements are more sensitive. Figure 3-8 shows the more sensitive elements in relation to 
independency. Specifically, five elements are sensitive, with weak tube material and high 
temperature being the most sensitive. This may be caused by enhanced probability of heat 
exchanger tubes failure when there is an increase in the percentage of weak tube material and 
high temperature. Furthermore, although the probability of heat exchanger tubes failure remains 
the same from the fretting due to vibration, the high pressure and fluid hammer.   
When the probability of failure rose from 10% to 100%, a subsequent rise occurred in the 
probability of heat exchanger tubes percentages. So, for instance, in the case of weak tube 
material, when the probability of failure rised beyond 60% and 90%, the probabilities of heat 
exchanger tube percentages rose 2% and 3% respectively. Similarly, when the probability of 
high temperature rise beyond 20%, 60% and 100%, the probabilities of heat exchanger tubes 
failure increase by 1%, 2% and 3% respectively. However, it remained only 1% when the 
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probability of fluid hammer and fretting due to vibration were increased beyond 50%. When, the 
probability of having a high pressure rises beyond 70%, the probability of fire increases by 1%. 
 
Figure 3-9: Sensitivity analysis of heat exchanger tubes failure in case of dependency. 
 
In case of dependency, neither high pressure nor weak tube material were considered 
here, as they are classified as intermediate events. Figure 3-9 illustrates some of the more 
sensitive elements in case of dependency. Here we see that while three elements are sensitive, 
the most sensitive of these are high temperature and fluid hammer. 
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Figure 3-10:  Comparison of percentage change for the dependency and independency 
relationship of the elements. 
 
Figure 3-10 was obtained from Figure 3-8 and Figure 3-9. It compares percentage 
changes for elements in cases of independency and dependency.  In case of independency, high 
temperature shows a greater percentage (1.5%), whereas in case of dependency, the fluid 
hammer shows a greater percentage (1%). Likewise, fretting due to vibration also shows a 
greater percentage in case of   independency (0.7%).  Figure 3-10 was obtained by averaging 
each element for independency and dependency and then comparing and contrasting to 
determine which of the elements show greater percentage changes. 
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   Figure 3-11: Reduction in percentage between dependency causation and independency 
causation. 
 
     Figure 3-11 was derived from Figure 3-10, which depicts the reduction percentage in 
each element.  As we can see, fretting due to vibration and fluid hammer show a reduction 
percentage (0.4%), while high temperature shows a reduction percentage of around (0.2%).  
The validation or the credibility of this study can be recognized due to the fact that this study 
is derived from a domain reference, which is OREDA database, coupled with domain expert 
knowledge for dependencies identification and quantification. Even the sensitivity analysis was 
not introduced in this manuscript for the first time; however, the methodology to implement it on 
a real offshore processing unit, and the ability to benefit from this application to perform other 
studies in wide range engineering fields, is the ancillary to accomplish these kind of studies. 
 For a compressor under a state of independency, it was determined that 11 elements were 
sensitive, as shown in Figures 3-3 (a and b). Of these 11 elements, the gear of the shaft breaks 
and rotor cracks were the most sensitive. For the compressor under state of dependency, 11 
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elements were sensitive, as illustrated in Figure 3-4 (a and b). Of these, the gear of the shaft 
breaks and rotor cracks were the most sensitive. The reduction percentage of each element under 
independency and dependency causation were also examined. It was determined that the gear of 
the shaft breaks and rotor cracks had the higher reduction percentage, as shown in Figure 3-6.   
In investigating the failure of heat exchanger tubes under independency, it was noted that 5 
elements were sensitive, as illustrated in Figure 3-8. Of these 5 elements, 2 were the most 
sensitive: weak tube material and high temperature.  It was also discovered that the probability of 
heat exchanger tubes failure was the same for high pressure, fluid hammer, and fretting due to 
vibration.  The failure of heat exchanger tubes under dependency was also investigated. It was 
discovered that 3 elements were sensitive (Figure 3-9), and of these 3 elements, 2 were the most 
sensitive: fluid hammer and high temperature. Next, similar elements were studied for 
independency and dependency in order to find out which of the elements experienced a greater 
percentage change. It was discovered that fretting due to vibration and high temperatures have a 
higher percentage under independency, whereas fluid hammer has a higher percentage under 
dependency (see Figure 3-10).  Finally, the reduction percentages of all the elements in instances 
of dependency causation and independency causation were computed. As shown in Figure 3-11, 
it was found that fretting due to vibration and fluid hammer presented higher reduction 
percentages. 
3.6. Conclusions 
This paper has presented sensitive causal mechanism analysis that can be used to determine 
cause variation impact on the overall accident probability, including dependency analysis. In 
fact, this paper demonstrated that the use of detailed causal analysis rather than failure rate 
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summary data such as that provided by OREDA database or OGP failure rate data resulted in an 
improvement in completeness and an increase in probability estimation for fire scenario on 
offshore compression unit from 5×10-3 to 7.32×10-3, an increase by 46% and increase in 
probability estimation of heat exchanger tube failure from 4×10-3 to 7.32×10-3, an increase by 
75%. Particular attention is paid to the fact that other modelling tools can be used; however, BN 
have been selected due to their capability to enable causal dependencies to be expressed in a 
simple way, and allowed calculation of the impact of this on the calculated frequencies. It’s 
worth noting that these conclusions are based on two examples from offshore processing unit; 
they can be applicable for a wide range of systems, as determined by a number of more limited 
trials. Furthermore, the data uncertainty is still depending on the subjective expert judgment and 
difficult to be standardized. Further research to solve these issues would be of interest.     
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Abstract  
Safety analysis for process components is necessary to prevent unwanted events that may lead to 
accidents. Although the conventional Bow-Tie (BT) technique has been applied extensively in 
safety and risk analysis, it suffers from severe limitations, including a static structure and 
inability to handle uncertainty. A Bayesian Network (BN) approach is an alternative to capture 
uncertainty and also to capture the evolution of the scenario. It is similar to Bow-Tie in many 
respects. However, it outperforms BT in terms of its ability to represent interdependency among 
51 
 
events and uncertainty. This paper demonstrates the suitability of a BN as a safety analysis tool 
with an application to subsea pipelines. This paper also highlights how limited data can be 
incorporated in a BN by using Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics. These logics help to 
conduct a safety analysis when data is limited and a scenario is evolving. 
Keywords: Bayesian Network analysis; Bow-Tie model; uncertainty modeling; Noisy-OR logic; 
Leaky Noisy-OR logic; dependency modeling. 
4.1. Introduction 
Ensuring sufficient safety can be challenging due to ongoing issues plaguing offshore 
facilities, such as inadequate ventilation, evacuation difficulties, high temperature/pressure, and 
limited space (Khan et al., 2002; Espen et al., 2012). Despite the presence of robust safety 
measures, accidents still occur in offshore process plants. The main instigators are process faults, 
human error, inappropriate design and manufacturing and component defects (Khan et al., 2002). 
In addition to affecting the environment, offshore accidents also affect people in terms of injuries 
and fatalities. For example, a slight breach in the transportation line of hydrocarbons can initiate 
a fire, resulting in a catastrophic event (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012). Recent accidents 
like the  Piper Alpha accident in the North Sea in 1988, the Petrobras P-36 in Brazil in 2001 
(Baksh et al., 2016), and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (Levy 
and Gopalakrishnan, 2010) resulted not only in injuries and loss of property, but also caused 
many deaths.  
Risk analysis is carried out before designing any process operation. Offshore risk analysis 
is necessary for protecting facilities from danger and for mitigating problems should accidents 
occur (Shan et al., 2017). Risk is defined as the product of the probability of an unwanted event 
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and the probability of consequences related to that event (Ceylan, 2013). The main purpose of 
risk analysis is to inform the decision-making system (DMS) when safety measures need to be 
strengthened to reduce the severity of an accident. It is worth mentioning that risk analysis 
cannot prevent accidents; it only helps mitigate adverse effects.  
Under general circumstances, risk analysis is performed by utilizing available data and 
expert judgment in order to predict the effect of an accident on people, property and the 
environment (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004). In the existing literature, risk analysis techniques are 
divided into three methods: quantitative, qualitative and hybrid techniques (Khan et al., 2015).  
Typical quantitative risk analysis tools include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Talebberrouane and 
Lounis, 2016), Event Tree analysis (ETA) (Cooke, 1997), Bow-Tie (BT) (Shan et al., 2017), and 
the Bayesian Network (BN) (Shan et al., 2017).  FTA visualizes connections between basic 
events that might lead to an undesirable scenario that is the top event of the fault tree. ETA is 
used to calculate the likelihood of probable outcomes of different consequences due to the 
initiation of an undesirable event (Vesely et al., 1981). The BT model is considered one of the 
most accurate of graphical models for conveying details of a complete accident scenario, ranging 
from accident causes to accident consequences. BT includes a fault tree indicating possible 
events contributing to the critical event, as well as an event tree indicating the most important 
possible consequences of the event (Delvosalle et al., 2005; Delvosalle et al., 2006). 
Both FTA and ETA are based on two main assumptions, both of which have challenges 
(Ferdous et al., 2011). The first assumption is that the probability of the basic events is crisp and 
known. This is nearly impossible in real-life scenarios due to incompleteness in data collection 
(Ferdous et al., 2009; Ferdous et al., 2011; Sadiq et al., 2008). Hence, it is often difficult to 
calculate precise numerical values (Yuhua and Datao, 2005). The second assumption is that basic 
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events are considered independent, which is inaccurate (Ferdous et al., 2011; Ferson et al., 2004). 
As a result, uncertainty emerges (Ferdous et al., 2011). Since BT is a combination of FTA and 
ETA, it cannot overcome the inherent limitations of these tools. However, BT is an excellent tool 
to use in simple processes. 
A Bayesian Network (BN) provides a more robust prediction than BT in complex 
systems (Pollino et al. 2007; Badreddine and Ben Amor, 2010). It can handle uncertainty and 
also show interdependency between basic events. Thus, it overcomes the generic nature of FTA 
(Khakzad et al., 2011) and allows the incorporation of different kinds of knowledge (e.g., expert 
judgment, feedback experience and observation) into a single model (Weber et al. 2012).  
Another major advantage of BN is that it easily combines existing frequency data with expert 
judgment within a probabilistic framework. 
The success of a BN depends on the proper estimation of conditional probability tables 
(CPTs). If enough data are available, CPTs can easily be estimated or defined. However, this is 
often not the case, especially when dealing with accidents or unwanted situations, which often 
occur. Expert opinion is often used to develop this table. Table 4-1 provides a list of some 
pioneering recent works that have used expert opinion to develop CPTs as part of the detailed 
risk analysis. 
 Source Focus 
Li et al., 2016  Quantitative risk analysis on leakage failure of submarine oil and gas 
pipelines using Bayesian network  
Celeux et al., 2006  Designing a Bayesian network for preventive maintenance using 
expert opinions in a rapid and reliable way  
Wilson et al., 2007 Bayesian networks for multilevel system reliability 
Weber et al., 2012 Overview on Bayesian networks applications for dependability, risk 
analysis and maintenance areas 
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Adedigba et al., 2016a Dynamic safety analysis of process systems using nonlinear and 
non-sequential accident model 
Adedigba et al., 2016b Process accident model considering dependency among contributory 
factors 
  
Conventionally, BNs are constructed with OR logics, which require complete data. 
Incorporating Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics allows a BN to perform with limited data. 
The objective of this work is to examine the performance of Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR 
logics, with importance analysis being selected as the comparative criterion. It is a ranking 
technique mainly for vulnerable basic events (Oniśko et al., 2001, Heckerman and Breese 1996). 
First, a BT model is developed and its performance compared with conventional OR logic-based 
BN. Next, the BN is reconstructed with Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics. The probability 
of different consequences is calculated and compared with those of the BN with OR logic. 
Finally, importance analysis is performed for all three logics to check whether the reconstructed 
BN can satisfactorily perform or not.  The rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses the 
methodology. Section 3 shows an application of the methodology. Finally, section 4 evaluates 
the contribution, advantages and limitations of the approach, and suggests directions for future 
work.  
4.2. Methodology    
The proposed methodology for dynamic risk assessment is presented in Figure 1. It is 
composed of five steps, as follows:  
Step 1: The system of interest is selected and available data are collected.  
Step 2: Potential hazardous accident scenarios are developed. 
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Step 3: The developed scenario is transformed to Bow-tie model for better understanding. BT 
has been chosen here, as it incorporates a higher degree of visual effects than other models with 
regard to the direct connections between accident causes and consequences. Bow-Tie is an 
effective tool for communicating and demonstrating risk controls and the management system.  
In the proposed methodology, BT is very appropriate, considering that there is a need to evaluate 
potential risk control options based on the potential consequences. It is also relatively easier to 
map information from a BT to a BN (Saud et al., 2014). 
Step 4: In this step, causality analysis is done to determine interdependency among variables. 
Available data and expert opinion are incorporated with the BT developed in step 3 to construct 
the BN. It should be noted that the BN is constructed for three different types of logics – OR, 
Noisy-OR, and Leaky Noisy-OR. Details of these are presented in subsequent subsections.  
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  Figure 4-1: Flow chart of proposed risk analysis methodology 
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   Step 5: One of the biggest advantages of a BN is that it gets updated at any state of any node, 
which makes it possible to renew the prior beliefs using the developed posterior probabilities. In 
this step, a BN is updated based on evidence when it becomes available, and the risk associated 
with different consequences is predicted. This helps the decision-makers using the model to take 
corrective measures. 
4.2.1 Bayesian Network (BN) 
A Bayesian Network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that is often applied to 
safety and risk analyses because of their probabilistic and uncertain knowledge (Pearl, 1988).  It 
is mainly constructed by combining nodes, acyclic arcs, and prior and conditional probabilities. 
The nodes of a BN represent different basic events, while the arcs denote the causal relationships 
among the events. The direction of the arcs denotes the type of node. The node from which an 
arc is created is called a parent node, while the node at which the arc is directed is called a child 
node. Conditional probability tables (CPTs) denote the degree of dependency among different 
events (Khakzad et al., 2013b). A BN can be used in safety and risk analysis. Its main 
advantages include the ability to represent event dependencies, capture uncertainty and update 
probabilities (Khakzad et al., 2011). It also allows for the incorporation of process knowledge 
from experts in case of data unavailability. 
According to the chain rule and conditional independence, the joint probability distribution, 
P(U) of a set of random events, U = {A1, … . . , An} is incorporated into the network as:  
  
 
𝑃(𝑈) =  ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
│𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖) ) (4.1) 
 
where Pa(Ai) is the parent set of Ai (Pearl,1998; Jense and Nielsen,2007).   
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A BN utilizes Bayes’ theorem to update the prior occurrence probability of events based on 
information. This information is known as evidence (𝐸 ). Posterior (𝑃/𝐸) refers to the belief of 
an event based on evidence. The posterior probability can be calculated   using Equation (4.2):  
 
P (U E) =
P(U, E)
P(E)
=
P(U, E)
∑ P(U, E)U  
⁄  (4.2) 
 
Canonical probabilistic models significantly reduce computational time and also make the 
construction of probabilistic models relatively easier. These types of models are now being 
frequently used in probabilistic systems (Oniśko et al., 2001; Diez and Druzdzel, 2007). In fact, 
different kinds of canonical models can readily co-exist in a variety of probabilistic networks. An 
effective way to make the elicitation of numerical probabilities less complex is to use canonical 
probabilistic models, as these can build probability distribution based on a small number of 
parameters (Diez and Druzdzel, 2007). Typical canonical interactions utilized in the BNs are 
Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics. Using canonical interactions in the BN provides an 
efficient means to model different kinds of non-linear interactions as well as statistical 
dependencies (Adedigba et al., 2016a).  
4.2.1.1 OR Logic 
OR logic is the most used logic in both BN and FT. Figure 4-2 is used for illustration purposes 
consider the two events- A and B in Figure 4-2.  
 
  Figure 4-2: Simple BN of two nodes 
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A is the parent node and B is the child node. In FT, A is the basic event and B is the top event. 
The CPT of B with FT-OR and BN-OR logics is shown in Table 4-2. 
 
 Table 4-2: CPT of B for FT-OR Logic and BN-OR Logic 
A True False 
B 
True 1 0 
False 0 1 
 
4.2.1.2 Noisy-OR Logic 
 
Noisy-OR logics follow a canonical model premised on the assumption that cause and 
effect are inherently binary and thus involve two states: True and False. The logics are utilized 
mainly if data are available, but they can also be used for describing interactions between n 
causes X1, X2, … , Xn and their common effect,  Y. The concept behind Noisy-OR logics is that 
every cause, Xi, affects Y independently, and that the cause, Xi, has a probability,Pi, which should 
be sufficient to create the effect,Y, even if all the other causes prove to be False (Oniśko et 
al.,2001). Given the above assumptions, specifying the conditional probability distribution using 
only the n parameters, P1, P2, . . . , Pn is achievable. Hence, Pi indicates that the effect, Y, will be 
True if the cause Xi is True, but the other causes,  𝑋𝑗,𝑗≠𝑖 , are False (Oniśko et al., 2001).  This 
can be mathematically expressed as: 
 
 𝑃𝑖 = Pr (y │X1, X2, … , Xi,…, Xn−1) (4-3) 
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It also follows that the probability of Y being given a subset of Xp of the Xi that are True and can 
be expressed in the equation: 
  
 Pr(Y|Xp) = 1 − ∏ (1 −
𝑖:𝑥𝑖∈𝑋𝑝
𝑃𝑖 ) 
(4-4) 
 
The formulation above is enough to compute the CPT of Y conditioned on its predecessors 
X1, X2, … , Xn.   
Applying the Noisy-OR logic would lead to a significant reduction in the probabilities required 
to quantify the above-mentioned cause-effect interaction. In this instance, the model needs n 
probabilities, whereas the unrestricted model requires 2𝑛 probabilities (Adedigba et al., 2016a; 
Heckerman and Breese, 1996).  
To illustrate how to apply Noisy OR and Leaky Noisy OR logics as a part of CPT, Auxiliaries 
failure has been chosen as simple example. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4-3: Bayesian network for causes of Auxiliaries Failure 
 
Figure 4-3 shows an example of the BN that presents the causes of Auxiliaries failure of a 
system, based on the failure probabilities given by Table 4-3. 
 
61 
 
 Table 4-3: Safe and failure probabilities of causes of Auxiliaries Failure 
 
No 
Causes of Auxiliaries Failure Failure probability (T) Safe probability (F) 
1 Failure due to long term usage (X20) 3.000×10−4  9.997×10−1 
2 Design fault of auxiliaries       (X21) 1.000×10−5 1.000×101 
  
The Noisy-OR logic can be expressed as in the following table. 
 Table 4-4: Probability of Auxiliaries Failure for Noisy-OR Logic. 
 
State 
Failure due 
to long term 
usage 
Design 
fault of 
auxiliaries 
True False Conditional Probability of Auxiliaries 
Failure for Different States 
1 𝐹 𝐹 0 1 0×9.997×10−1×1.000×101 = 0 
2 𝐹 𝑻 2×10−1 8×10−1 2×10−1×9.997×10−1×1.000×10−5
= 1.999×10−6 
3 𝑻 𝐹 7×10−1 3×10−1 7×10−1×3.000×10−4×1.000×101
= 2.10×10−3 
4 𝑇 𝑇 7.6×10−1 2.4×10−1
= 3×10−1
×8×10−1 
7.6×10−1×3.000×10−4×1.000×10−5
= 2.28×10−9 
 
The probability of Auxiliaries Failure is the sum of all states=   2.10×10−3 
4.2.1.3 Leaky Noisy-OR Logic   
 
   Leaky Noisy-OR logic is an extension of binary Noisy-OR logic, and is useful in 
conditions where the effect variable in a subsystem can be True despite the causes being False. 
Leaky Noisy-OR logic is typically applied in scenarios where a model cannot express all of the 
potential causes of effect Y ( Oniśko et al.,2001) ; Adedigba et al., 2016a). In Leaky Noisy-OR 
logic, the combined effect of the causes of effect is referred to as leak probability l. This leak 
probability(l) is the probability that effect  Y will occur spontaneously (True), despite its causes 
being absent (False) ( Oniśko et al.,2001; Adedigba et al., 2016a; Zagorecki and Druzdzel, 
2004).  The equation for Leaky Noisy-OR logic for calculating the probability of effect Y based 
on the subset Xp of 𝑋𝑖,  which is True, is given by: 
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 Pr(Y|Xp) = 1 − [(1 − l) ∏ (1 − Pi)]
i:Xi∈Xp
 (4-5) 
The Leaky Noisy-OR logic can be expressed as follows: 
 
Table 4-5: Probability of Auxiliaries Failure for Leaky Noisy-OR Logic. 
State Failure 
due to 
long 
term 
usage 
Design 
fault of 
auxiliaries 
True False Conditional Probability of 
Auxiliaries Failure for 
Different States 
1 𝐹 𝐹 1×10−2 9.9×10−1 1×10−2×9.997×10−1×1.000
×101 =  
9.997×10−2 
2 𝐹 𝑻 2.08×10−1 7.92×10−1 = 8×10−1×9.9
×10−1 
2.08×10−1×9.997×10−1
×1.000×10−5   
=  
2.08×10−6 
 
3 𝑻 𝐹 7.03×10−1 2.97×10−1 = 3×10−1×9.9
×10−1 
7.03×10−1×3.000×10−4
×1.000×101
= 2.11×10−3   
  
 
4 𝑇 𝑇 7.6×10−1 2.4×10−1 = 3×10−1×8
×10−1×9.9
×10−1 
7.62×10−1×3.000×10−4
×1.000×10−5
=  
2.29×10−9  
 
 
The probability of Auxiliaries Failure is the sum of all states=   1.02×10−1 
In Tables 4-4 and 4-5, the terms True and False indicate the following: (True) means the system 
fail, and (False) means the system will not fail. 
To clarify how CPT has been calculated in Noisy-OR logic and Leaky Noisy OR logic, an 
example is presented using Auxiliaries Failure. See Tables 4-4 and 4-5. 
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According to the example, Noisy-OR logic and Leaky Noisy OR logics have two failure 
probabilities, which should be found and then contributed to the calculation of other values. 
4.3. Application of Methodology  
To demonstrate the suitability of the proposed methodology, a subsea pipeline leak is 
considered as the hazard. Despite having a higher associated risk of an accident, a subsea 
pipeline is a major means of transporting hydrocarbons in many countries (Dey et al., 2007). 
Underwater pipelines are subject to numerous vulnerabilities, such as buckling (Liu and Yan, 
2014), fatigue crack (Zhang et al., 2016), corrosion (Yang et al., 2017), problems with gas 
hydrates (Mokhatab et al., 2007), vibrations caused by a pipeline’s internal fluid contents (Reda 
et al., 2014) and leaks (Hu et al., 2013).   
4.3.1. BT of Subsea Pipeline Leak 
A BT model is constructed which captures all the possible causes and consequences for a 
leak in a subsea pipeline. A subsea pipeline leak is the connecting point for the FT and ET of the 
BT diagram. Prior knowledge of the failure mechanism has been utilized to develop the FT and 
ET. FTA is used to evaluate the failure probability of safety barriers. The aim of using safety 
barriers is to reduce the severity of an undesired event (Xue et al., 2013). Three safety barriers 
(monitoring or Inspection barrier, emergency shutdown barrier and human factors and 
organizational barrier) are employed to minimize the damage due to a subsea pipeline leak.  A 
total of 44 basic events have been used to construct the BT model, while 21 basic events are 
employed to build the FT of the subsea pipeline leak.  The rest of the basic events are utilized to 
construct the FT for three safety barriers. 
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The prior probabilities for the basic events were obtained from three major reference 
sources (Yang et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016; Rathnayaka et al., 2012). Expert judgment has also 
been used to assign values of probabilities based on their subject knowledge and experience. The 
data provided in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 are presented as examples of some of the elements used 
in the modeling process. 
The FT is constructed showing probable factors that can cause a subsea pipeline leak. A 
leak can occur due to a number of factors, such as corrosion, natural hazards, external loading 
failure and defects in the pipe. Corrosion can occur in both external and internal surfaces. 
External corrosion is mainly caused by external coating failure and cathodic protection failure, 
while internal corrosion arises from the presence of corrosive gas and unwanted substances 
inside the pipe, as well as from irregular pigging, internal coating failure and the absence of a 
corrosion inhibitor.  Natural hazards include earthquakes, seabed movement, hurricanes and 
freezing. External loading failures are caused by excessive external pressure, seabed soil erosion, 
the impact of  a dropped object, anchoring work and offshore construction. Defects in the pipe 
may be due to weld-seam defects, material defects or auxiliaries failure.  Weld-seam and 
material defects are caused by design faults and are mostly due to construction and 
manufacturing defects. Such defects may cause pipeline leaks if external forces come into play.  
Auxiliary failures due to long-term usage and design faults can also cause leaks. 
A complete accident scenario has been developed to build the ET. In this scenario, safety 
barriers play a crucial role in determining the consequences. When functioning as intended, 
monitoring or inspection is able to note any alterations from normal work conditions in the 
pressure and flux in pipelines. Should such changes such as leakage be perceived, there would be 
immediate implementation of emergency shutdown procedures, which usually involves cutting 
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off the globe valves and stopping the pump. However, under certain conditions, there may be no 
stoppage of the pump or cutting off of globe valves, or only partial stoppage or cutting off. 
One barrier that can affect the entire process of leakage accident evolution is human and 
organizational factors. These factors can change the procedure by triggering the monitor, alarm 
and emergency shutdown, or by finding alarm signals and judging and verifying the leakage’s 
occurrence. Five possible consequences – safe (A), near miss (B), incident (C), accident (D) and 
catastrophic accident (E) – are identified and depend on the number of safety barrier failures. 
The consequences for subsea pipeline leaks are defined below. 
 Safe: There was a leak, but it was monitored and identified, the emergency shutdown system 
was activated and human response action was taken.  As a result, the leak did not have 
any impact. 
Near miss: A leak was monitored and the emergency shutdown system was activated; a delayed 
human response was observed. As a result, a minor loss was recorded. 
Incident: One safety barrier malfunction. However, major loss was avoided due to proper action 
of the other two barriers. 
Accident:  Some safety barriers failed. As a result, there was significant loss. 
Catastrophic accident:  All safety barriers failed. As a result, loss of life, serious injury, a huge 
financial, and environmental impacts occurred. 
The FTs and ET are integrated to construct the BT. The developed BT is shown in Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4: BT of subsea pipeline leak 
 
 
 
Monitoring or 
inspection 
barrier failure
Emergency 
shutdown 
barrier failure
Human factors and 
Organisational 
Barrier  Failure  
Automatic 
shutdown fail
Manual 
shutdown fail
Y9Y7 Y8
Y10 Y11
Organisational 
barrier failure
Human factors 
barrier failure
Y12
Y13 Y14 Y15
Consequences
No
Yes
           1A
Monitoring 
barrier failure
Inspection 
barrier failure
Y3Y2Y1 Strategic 
errors
Y4
Y5 Y6
Information 
sharing system 
failure
Human system 
interface barrier 
failure
Personal 
characteristics 
barrier failure
Y16
Poor 
communication
Y17 Y18
Y19 Y20
Y21 Y22 Y23
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
 2B
3C
4E
5C
 6D
8E
7D
67 
 
 Table 4-6: Basic Events of Subsea Pipeline Leak  
    
Symb
ol 
Basic Events Prior 
Probability 
Posterior Probability 
OR Noisy OR Leaky 
Noisy-OR 
X1  Excessive external pressure 5.62×10−6 4.20×10−4 
 
3.25×10−4 3.85×10−4 
X2 Seabed soil erosion 
6.00×10−3 
 
   5.21×10−1 4.50×10−1 4.90×10−1 
X3 Dropped object impact  1.50×10−4 1.05×10−2 
 
1.01×10−3 3.38×10−3 
X4 Anchoring work 2.00×10−4 1.40×10−2 
 
1.32×10−3 1.10×10−2 
X5 Offshore construction 5.00×10−5 3.54×10−3 
 
3.30×10−4 2.75×10−3 
X6 External coating failure 5.00×10−4 3.50×10−2 
 
5.62×10−3 3.34×10−2 
X7 Cathodic protection failure  2.70×10−4 1.89×10−2 2.83×10−3 1.22×10−2 
X8 Presence of corrosion gas 
and unwanted substances 
1.00×10−3 7.01×10−2 3.99×10−3 6.60×10−2 
X9 Absence of corrosion 
inhibitor 
1.10×10−4 5.50×10−3 9.00×10−4 4.30×10−3 
X10 Irregular pigging 2.00×10−4 1.20×10−2 1.70×10−3 1.11×10−2 
X11 Internal coating failure 7.74×10−4 5.43×10−2 8.70×10−3 3.36×10−2 
X12 Earthquake 6.30×10−6 4.00×10−4 3.00×10−4 3.60×10−4 
X13 Seabed movement 2.00×10−3 1.54×10−1 1.35×10−1 1.45×10−1 
X14 Hurricane 3.70×10−5 2.35×10−3 4.00×10−4 2. 02×10−3 
X15 Freezing 2.00×10−5 4.55×10−4 2.00×10−4 4.15×10−4 
X16 Design fault of weld- seam 2.30×10−4 1.61×10−2 4.00×10−4 4.81×10−3 
X17 Defect due to construction 6.50×10−4 4.56×10−2 3.70×10−3 3.14×10−2 
X18 Design fault of material  8.40×10−4 5.89×10−2 2.45×10−3 2.50×10−3 
X19 Manufacturing defects 9.70×10−4 6.80×10−2 1.90×10−3 2.20×10−2 
X20 Failure due to long term 
usage  
3.20×10−4 2.24×10−2 8.00×10−4 8.28×10−3 
X21 Design fault of auxiliaries 1.00×10−5 4.00×10−4 1.85×10−5 7.63×10−5 
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 Table 4-7: Basic Events of Safety Barrier Failure 
  
Symbol Basic Events Prior Probability  
Y1 Programmable logic controller 
(PLC) failure 
5.00×10−4 
Y2 Signal transmission failure in the 
line 
2.00×10−4 
Y3 Sensor failure 2.40×10−2 
Y4 Harsh subsea environment 1.00×10−3 
Y5 Delayed inspection 1.00×10−2 
Y6 Inspection overload  2.00×10−2 
Y7 Programmable logic controller 
(PLC) failure  
5.00×10−4 
Y8 Emergency shutdown  valve 
failure (ESD valve failure) 
1.30×10−2 
Y9 Hydraulic control failure 1.32×10−1 
Y10 Emergency shutdown  valve 
failure (ESD valve failure) 
1.30×10−2 
Y11 Operator response to active 
manual ESD failure 
6.00×10−2 
Y12 Lack of communication 5.00×10−2 
Y13 Insufficient safety program 1.00×10−2 
Y14 Inadequate supervision 3.40×10−2 
Y15 Lack of training 2.50×10−2 
Y16 Insufficient work instruction  2.50×10−2 
Y17 Lack of communication 5.00×10−2 
Y18 Failure of communication 2.50×10−2 
Y19 Warning display failure 5.00×10−2 
Y20 Warning alarm failure 2.00×10−2 
Y21 Physical disability 5.00×10−2 
Y22 Failure of operator dexterity 
improvement program 
2.00×10−2 
Y23 Failure of regular operator 
training 
3.40×10−2 
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4.3.2. Mapping of BT into BN 
 
The mapping algorithm presented by (Khakzad et al., 2013b) has been used to map the 
BT into a BN. Figure 4-5 shows the developed BN. As can be seen, the FT is based on the causal 
relationships among primary and intermediate events.  The safety barriers in the tree-mapping 
process are represented as safety nodes, while the consequence node with five states related to 
the end-state are represented with the event tree.  
First, the BN has been constructed for the OR logic, while Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR 
logics have been used to reconstruct the BN.  The graphical network software (GeNIe) is used to 
do the simulation.   
By using OR logic in the BN, the probability of a subsea pipeline leak is estimated 
as 1.43×10−2, This is identical to the FT calculation.  However, when including the CPT 
amendments Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR, the probability of a subsea pipeline leak increases 
to 3.75×10−3 and 5.12×10−2, respectively.   As an example, the estimated values using non-amended 
CPT (i.e., 1.43×10−2) can be applied to calculate the occurrence probabilities of consequences.  
The probabilities of end-states are calculated and shown in Table 4-9. It is worth noting that the 
results of the occurrence probabilities of consequences are slightly different than those in the 
Bow-Tie model. This is due to conditional dependencies among top events of the FT and safety 
barriers being considered.  
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Figure 4-5: Bayesian Network mapping from Bow-Tie 
 
 
Figure 4-6:  BN for monitoring or inspection barrier failure and emergency shutdown barrier 
failure 
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Figure 4-7: BN for human factors and organisational barrier failure 
 
As shown in Figures 4-6 and 4-7, the top events include: monitoring or inspection barrier 
failure, emergency shutdown barrier failure and human and organisational failure barrier.  The 
values of the top events are calculated for BN with OR, Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics 
after assigning the CPTs.  Table 4-8 shows the probability of different top events. 
Table 4-8: Failure probabilities of Subsea Pipeline and its Safety Barriers Calculated with Bow-
Tie and   Bayesian Network Using Different Logic. 
 Top events BT Analysis 
BN Analysis 
OR Noisy-OR Leaky Noisy -OR 
Subsea pipeline leak  1.43×10−2 1.43×10−2 3.75×10−3 5.12×10−2 
Monitoring or inspection 
barrier failure  
5.47×10−2 5.47×10−2 1.35×10−2 3.40×10−2 
Emergency shutdown 
barrier failure  
1.04×10−2 1.04×10−2 7.24×10−2 9.01×10−2 
Human factors and 
organisational barrier 
failure 
2.78×10−2 2.78×10−2 5.34×10−2 7.89×10−2 
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From Table 4-8, it can be seen that for the BN analysis, the failure probability of all the 
safety barriers is lower for OR and Noisy-OR logics compared to that of Leaky Noisy-OR logic. 
This might be due to the uncertainties of the conditional dependencies among the linked nodes in 
the BN. Further, lower conditional probabilities were assigned compared to the case in which the 
OR and Noisy OR logics were used. In instances where the Leaky Noisy-OR logic was applied 
to the BN, a higher failure probability for all the prevention barriers is observed. At the same 
time, the failure probability of the top event (i.e., subsea pipeline leak) was lower for OR and 
Noisy-OR compared to Leaky Noisy-OR, which was 5.12×10−2.  These results show that the 
active failures of the assigned prevention barriers were instrumental in contributing to the 
accident. In fact, preventive measures could have been applied to avoid the failure of the safety 
barriers if proper and appropriate inspection and maintenance procedures had been followed. 
Table 4-9: Failure Probabilities of Different Consequences Calculated with Bow-Tie and 
Bayesian   Network 
 
Index 
Consequences BT Analysis 
BN Analysis 
OR Noisy-OR Leaky Noisy -OR 
1 A: Safe 1.30×10−2 1.30×10−2 3.25×10−3 4.15×10−2 
2 B: Near miss 3.71×10−4 3.71×10−4 1.83×10−4 3.55×10−3 
3 C:Incident 8.87×10−4 8.87×10−4 2.98×10−4 5.57×10−3 
4 D:Accident 2.94×10−5 2.94×10−5 5.98×10−6 2.69×10−4 
5 
E: Catastrophic 
Accident 
4.13×10−6 4.13×10−6 1.45×10−5 3.65×10−4 
 
From Figure 4-4, eight consequence probabilities have been obtained that represent a 
combination of similar consequences.  
Table 4-9 presents the results of the consequence analysis. As can be seen, there is a sizeable 
difference in the range of occurrence probability. For instance, in Leaky Noisy-OR, the 
occurrence probability rises to the order of 10−04, meaning that it significantly heightens the risk 
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involved, while for the other approaches, the occurrence probability ranges from 10−05  to 
10−06. In case of “safe”, increases to the order of 10−02, and for the  other approaches, the 
occurrence probability is   10−03.   In case of “near miss”, “incident” and “accident”, in Leaky 
Noisy-OR, the occurrence probability grows to the order of 10−03  and 10−04, while for the 
other approaches, the occurrence probability ranges between 10−05 to 10−06. 
4.4. Importance Analysis 
Updating the mechanism of a BN in the presence of certain evidence allows for the 
performance of importance analysis. This can identify the most vulnerable root causes of a leak, 
which eventually helps to develop adequate safety precautions to mitigate the frequency of the 
causes. The important root causes can be ranked based on the percentage increase in the renewed 
priors from the actual ones. To do so, evidence is provided to the BN that a leak has occurred 
and renewed prior probability for all the basic events is observed.   
First, importance analysis for the BN with the OR Logic is conducted. The updated BN 
identifies seabed soil erosion as the most important root cause of the subsea pipeline leak, 
showing an increase of 85.78%. Seabed movement shows an increase of a 76.11% failure 
probability in the updated BN. This suggests that the geology should be studied well before 
designing the pipeline track. Excessive external pressure has almost the same importance. 
Irregular pigging, design faults of auxiliaries and the absence of corrosion inhibitors show less 
importance, which is an indication of proper maintenance and sufficient safety measures in the 
design and manufacturing stages. Freezing has the lowest impact among natural calamities. A 
different outcome would be obtained if the pipeline were designed to serve in arctic regions, 
which would have a significant impact on the importance analysis. 
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  Figure 4-8: Importance analysis of subsea pipeline leak 
One of the key aspects of this paper is examining the performance of a BN when there is 
insufficient data by using Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics.  Analysis of the updated BN 
for these two logics shows that seabed soil erosion and seabed movement are the most important 
factors in a subsea pipeline leak. For the use of Noisy-OR logic, excessive external pressure is 
the third most important factor in a subsea pipeline leak, as with the OR logic. Design faults, 
manufacturing defects and failure due to long term usage have the lowest importance in Noisy-
OR logic. Results from Leaky Noisy-OR logic also suggest that design faults make only a small 
contribution to a leak. In general, Leaky Noisy-OR Logic gives better results than Noisy-OR 
logic, using the OR logic results as a standard. Furthermore, these two logics can identify the 
most important root causes. Figure 8 shows the comparative importance analysis for all three 
logics using a BN. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
In this paper, an approach was presented that demonstrates how risk analysis can be 
performed in the absence of complete data. A BN can handle uncertainty robustly, and the use of 
Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics improves its uncertainty handling capacity and limits the 
exhaustive data requirement. A subsea pipeline leak was considered as the case study. A BT was 
developed which captures all the possible failure causes of a leak and shows the potential 
consequences as a result of a leak in the subsea pipeline. The BT was then converted to a BN for 
OR, Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics. 
This study indicates that a BN can be a useful tool in risk analysis, even when limited 
data are available.  Although the failure probabilities of leak and safety barriers vary for BT and 
BN, it is more reasonable to consider the BN to be a more intuitive approach, as it can capture 
the uncertainty and complex dependencies among root failure causes. The results obtained for 
the three different logics also varied. Usually, results obtained from Noisy-OR have similarities 
with the use of OR logic. A higher probability value is generally observed for the Leaky Noisy-
OR logic. However, a certain deviation in outcome is to be expected when there is data 
uncertainty. The results pertaining to importance analysis also support the conclusion that a BN 
constructed with Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR is effective in risk analysis as well as in the 
identification of critical root causes.  
The main contribution of this work is to reduce the data requirement by applying the BN 
in risk analysis using Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR. It can be applied to any complex system. 
However, this technique first needs to be validated using real precursor data from industries. 
Future work may include detailed construction of the FTs of a subsea pipeline leak and safety 
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barriers. A BN inference mechanism for Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics needs to be more 
robustly informed to better understand the message propagation behaviour. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Summary 
The present study has illustrated failure analysis of the offshore process component 
considering causation dependence.  In this study, two case studies were presented which are fire 
in compressor unit and heat exchanger tubes failure. A sensitivity analysis was conducted in each 
case to determine the most critical components to failure. This part demonstrated that the use of 
detailed causal analysis rather than failure rate summary data such as that provided by OREDA 
database or OGP failure rate data resulted in an improvement in completeness and an increase in  
probability estimation for fire scenario on offshore compression unit from 5×10−3to 7.32×10−3, 
an increase by 46% and increase in probability estimation of heat exchanger tube failure from 
4×10−3to 7.32×10−3, an increase by 75%. The values of probability are high because not all the 
aspects contributing the probability was captured. Further a technique to map a Bow-tie (BT) to 
Bayesian Network is presented. This is necessary because of the limitations of BT in handling 
uncertainty and interdependency among events. Also, The Bayesian Network was studied in 
terms of its suitability in safety analysis with an application to subsea pipeline. This study 
highlights how limited data can be incorporated in a BN by using Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-
OR logics.  Failure probabilities of Subsea Pipeline and its Safety Barriers were calculated with 
Bow-tie and   Bayesian Network using OR, Noisy- OR and Leaky Noisy OR Logics. Failure 
Probabilities of different consequences were calculated with Bow-Tie and Bayesian Network.  
Finally, importance analysis was performed for 21 basic events using OR, Noisy- OR and Leaky 
Noisy OR Logics to determine which elements are important.        
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 5.2 Conclusions 
In this study, the sensitivity analysis is performed in the case of dependency between the 
root causes and the case of independency. The approach adopted for conducting the sensitivity 
analysis is that, the percentages of each root cause representing a parameter have been increased 
from 0% to 100% by a step of 10%. Then based on the BN model, the percentage change on the 
probability of the top event is reported. To find out which of the basic events has more impact on 
the undesired event, a comparative study is performed based on the generated data.  Further, this 
study used a mapping algorithm from bow-tie approach into a Bayesian network. Although the 
conventional Bow-tie (BT) technique has been applied extensively in safety and risk analysis. It 
suffers from severe limitations including static structure and inability to handle uncertainty. A 
Bayesian Network (BN) approach is a good tool to capture uncertainty and representing 
interdependency among events. The FT developed is based on the causal relationships among 
primary and intermediate events. The safety barriers in the tree-mapping process are represented 
as safety nodes, while the consequence node with five states related to the end-state are 
represented with the event tree.   
First, the BN has been constructed for the OR logic, while the Noisy-OR and Leaky 
Noisy-OR logics have been used to reconstruct the BN.  The graphical network software 
(GeNIe) is used to do the simulation.  An importance analysis was also carried out to identify the 
most vulnerable root causes of a leak, which eventually helps to develop adequate safety 
precautions to mitigate the frequency of the causes. The important root causes can be ranked 
based on the percentage increase in the renewed priors from the original ones. To do so, evidence 
is provided to the BN that a leak has occurred and renewed prior probability for all the basic 
events is observed.  
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5.2 Future Works 
Future work may include detailed construction of the FTs of a compressor unit, heat 
exchanger tubes failure, a subsea pipeline leak and safety barriers. A BN inference mechanism 
for Noisy-OR and Leaky Noisy-OR logics needs to be more robustly informed to better 
understand the message propagation behavior. In addition, the data uncertainty is still depending 
on the subjective expert judgment and difficult to rely on this for decision making. Further 
research to solve these issues would be important.     
 
. 
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